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ABSTRACT 
 
As traditionally conducted, benefit-cost analysis is rooted in neoclassical welfare economics, 
which assumes that individuals act rationally and are primarily motivated by self-interest, 
making decisions that maximize their own well-being. Its conduct is now evolving to reflect 
recent work in behavioral economics, which integrates psychological aspects of decisionmaking. 
We consider several implications for analyses of social programs. First, benefit-cost analysis 
often involves valuing nonmarket outcomes such as reductions in health and environmental risks. 
Behavioral research emphasizes the need to recognize that these values are affected by 
psychological as well as physical attributes. Second, benefit-cost analysis traditionally uses 
exponential discounting to reflect time preferences, while behavioral research suggests that 
individuals’ discounting may be hyperbolic. However, steep near-term rates may largely reflect 
impulsive behavior and self-control problems. Third, behavioral research emphasizes the 
influence of social preferences on valuation. In addition to acting altruistically, individuals may 
act reciprocally to reward or punish others, or use the status of others as the baseline against 
which to assess their own well-being. Fourth, behavioral economics identifies factors that can 
help develop valuation studies that provide well-informed, thoughtful preferences. Finally, while 
behavioral research has led some to argue for a more paternalistic approach to policy analysis, an 
alternative is to continue to focus on describing the preferences of those affected by the policy 
options while working to ensure that these preferences are based on knowledge and careful 
reflection. Benefit-cost analysis can be best viewed as a pragmatic framework for collecting, 
organizing, and evaluating relevant information. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Policymakers face difficult choices in determining how to best allocate scarce resources across 
social programs and other desirable goods and services. Benefit-cost analysis provides useful 
information for these decisions, by indicating the extent to which the values that individuals 
place on program outcomes are likely to exceed program costs. Determining these values has 
always been challenging, however. Most social programs lead at least in part to outcomes for 
which no market value exists, such as improved health and longevity or environmental quality. 
Instead, these values must be estimated from market behavior for related goods or by asking 
individuals about their willingness to pay. Recent research in behavioral economics adds to the 
complexity of this task, documenting ways in which individuals at times appear to act 
irrationally or contrary to their own interests.1 
This paper supports the development of principles and standards for benefit-cost analysis 
of social programs, focusing on the implications of behavioral economics. We review traditional 
practices, discuss findings from behavioral research, and recommend ways in which these 
findings might be integrated into benefit-cost analyses. We take the perspective of an analyst 
who has been asked to evaluate a given set of policy options and is curious about how behavioral 
economics might influence the assessment. We concentrate largely on empirical research results 
and their practical application, while recognizing that theory provides a useful, simplified model 
of reality that can help promote rigorous thinking about these issues. 
Behavioral economics is a large and rapidly growing field, and is just beginning to move 
towards an unified theory that provides a cohesive alternative or supplement to the standard 
economic model.2 Its status has several implications for our discussion. First, the dividing line 
between behavioral economics and conventional neoclassical economics is often murky. Both 
address behavior, and many findings identified as behavioral economics can be accommodated 
within the standard model. Second, while researchers have found an increasing number of 
behavioral deviations from neoclassical economic assumptions, it is not yet clear how significant 
many of these deviations are in terms of magnitude or pervasiveness. Much of the research 
involves small-scale laboratory experiments and needs to be supplemented by additional 
fieldwork to explore the real-world importance of the findings. Third, these deviations are often 
dependent on the context, and more work is needed to determine whether the deviations found in 
the contexts frequently studied (e.g., financial decisions) are equally important in the context of 
the policy decisions we consider. Finally, the rapid growth in related research means that it is not 
possible to be comprehensive. We select key topics for detailed consideration rather than 
attempting to review the entire literature. Because we are drafting this paper as behavioral 
economics evolves in significant ways, we often raise questions or pose alternatives without 
attempting to resolve the underlying issues, describing concerns that researchers and analysts 
may wish to consider. 
Below, we briefly summarize the distinction between behavioral and neoclassical 
economics, then introduce the features of the benefit-cost analysis framework that are the focus 
of this paper. The remaining sections then discuss each topic in turn. 
 
                                                 
1 Examples of seminal work and comprehensive reviews include Thaler (1992), Rabin (1998), Kahneman and 
Tversky (2000), Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004), Fudenberg (2006), and DellaVigna (2009). 
2 Examples of alternative framing include: Sugden (2004, 2005a, 2009), Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009), Green 
and Hojman (2009), and Smith and Moore (2010).  
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1.1 Behavioral vs. Neoclassical Economics 
 
 “Behavioral” economics is somewhat of a misnomer, because all economics is concerned with 
how people behave in economic contexts. Behavioral economists often distinguish their work by 
noting that, in its simplest form, the standard economic model generally assumes that people 
behave self-interestedly and rationally (as “econs” or “homo economicus”), while they consider 
how human behavior may deviate from this model. In determining how to best conduct benefit-
cost analysis, the issue becomes identifying where the findings from behavioral economics might 
lead to analytic approaches that differ from typical practices. 
Thaler and Mullainathan (2008) argue that the standard economic model assumes three 
unrealistic traits: unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness. 
Bounded rationality recognizes that humans have limited capacity to process information, so 
often do not solve problems optimally. Instead, they may at times come to conclusions based on 
heuristics or simple decision rules. 
Bounded willpower reflects humans’ incomplete self-control. We may engage in 
unhealthy behavior (such as eating or drinking too much, saving too little, or smoking) while at 
the same time recognizing that such behavior is damaging. Bounded selfishness refers to the fact 
that we may act selflessly. While altruistic behavior is recognized in traditional economics, 
neoclassical theory stresses self-interest as the primary motivator. Behavioral economists have 
documented ways in which individuals may instead act out of concern for others or based on 
conceptions of fairness, reflecting vengeful as well as altruistic motives. 
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the use of behavioral data to determine 
preferences for, or the value of, the outcomes of social programs. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) 
frame the issues in a way that is particularly useful in this context. They note that “[p]ublic 
economics has positive and normative objectives; it aims both to describe the effects of public 
policies and to evaluate them. This agenda requires us to formulate models of human decision-
making with two components – one describing choices, and the other describing well-being. 
Using the first component, we can forecast the effects of policy reforms on individuals’ actions, 
as well as on prices and allocations. Using the second component, we can determine whether 
these changes benefit consumers or harm them” (p. 7). This distinction between behavior and 
welfare is not necessary under the traditional economic model because that model assumes that 
individuals choose what they want; i.e., that their preferences are revealed through their 
behavior. 
 While there is no consensus on how to evaluate welfare given this distinction, Bernheim 
and Rangel describe two schools of thought. One is to continue to rely on revealed preferences 
(integrating behavior and welfare) but to expand how we think about preferences to include 
deviations from the standard model. The second is to modify, or even reject, the reliance on 
revealed preferences, suggesting that preferences should be used to measure welfare only in 
those cases where they appear consistent with the individual’s self-interest. While potentially 
protecting against errors, this more paternalistic approach runs into the possibility of abuse if 
individual preferences can be overridden without adequate, evidence-based justification. This 
tension between unquestioning acceptance of individual choices and acceptance of only those 
that are judged to be rational and welfare-enhancing is at the heart of many of the implications of 
behavioral economics for the conduct of benefit-cost analysis. 
 
1.2 Behavior and Benefit-Cost Analysis 
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Implementing benefit-cost analysis involves several iterative and intertwined steps, that involve 
characterizing the affected universe with and without the policy intervention and assessing the 
social costs and benefits of each option. We provide a simplified overview of this process in 
Figure 1.3 
 
Figure 1. Simplified Overview of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
1) Determine baseline conditions
2) Predict response to 
intervention
3) Estimate costs associated
with intervention
4) Estimate benefits associated 
with intervention
5) Determine net benefits
6) Assess distribution of costs 
and benefits  
 
 
Typically, costs are defined as the opportunity costs of the real resources expended to 
develop, implement, and operate a program or to comply with regulatory or other requirements, 
including any market impacts. Benefits typically include the monetary value of the outcomes that 
are the goal of the policy: improved education, increased safety, greater employment, enhanced 
housing, and so forth. Ideally, any significant side effects (cost-savings or ancillary benefits) are 
included, and the implications of nonquantified effects and uncertainty are carefully assessed. 
While these analyses provide important and useful information, policy decisions are rarely, if 
ever, based solely on their results. Decisionmakers often seek additional information that cannot 
be easily captured in an economic analysis. 
Behavior, and the implications of behavioral economics research, permeate each step of a 
benefit-cost analysis, and also influence how policy decisions are made and how the public 
perceives the impacts. Some analytic steps directly involve predicting future behavior, while 
others use behavior more indirectly to value nonmarket outcomes. We focus on largely on the 
latter issues in this paper, because they raise more difficult issues for the analyst. 
In particular, we do not discuss the implications of behavioral economics for determining 
current and potential future baseline conditions in the absence of intervention, nor for estimating 
                                                 
3 See Robinson (2004) and Robinson (2008a) for more information on current practices for regulatory analysis; 
practices will vary in other policy contexts. 
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responses to different policies. For example, behavioral economics is helpful in predicting how 
individuals are likely to respond to information provision (e.g., on the caloric content of food or 
on energy efficiency), including information on the trade-off between short-term costs and 
longer-term savings.4 A well-conducted analysis attempts to be as realistic as possible; it seems 
self-evident that analysts should use whatever information appears likely to improve their 
predictions, regardless of whether the behavior appears rational or welfare-enhancing. The 
implications of behavioral economics for these types of predictions are diverse, vary 
significantly across different contexts, and are addressed in a large and rapidly growing 
literature.5 
We also do not discuss the role of behavioral economics in estimating social costs. The 
focus on real resource expenditures means that market data often can be used to estimate 
monetary values, and such data will already reflect the effects of behavioral influences. In the 
case of a small program (such as a local addiction treatment center), the analyst is likely to be 
concerned primarily with direct expenditures on wages and benefits, space rental, equipment, 
supplies, and so forth, which can be directly estimated from market prices or technical 
(engineering) information. Implementation of the program is not likely to significantly change 
these prices. However, the cost analysis will be closely linked to predicting responses, as 
discussed above. Individual decisions (and any associated behavioral anomalies) may determine 
program size (e.g., the number of addicts served and the efficacy of the treatment), in turn 
affecting those costs that vary with participation rates.6 
When a program is large enough to noticeably affect market conditions, accounting for 
behavioral factors may become more important. To predict the effects of the program on supply 
and/or demand conditions in particular sectors or throughout the economy, analysts may be able 
to rely on market data that already reflects any associated behavioral anomalies (e.g., observed 
supply or demand elasticities). In other cases, analysts may need to predict impacts outside the 
range of the available data, taking behavioral factors into account.  
When market outcomes are affected by behavioral factors, the estimated resource costs 
may differ from those that would be estimated if the markets functioned in accordance with the 
standard model. As an example, if consumers undervalue future energy savings from adopting 
compact fluorescent light bulbs or more fuel-efficient motor vehicles (because of hyperbolic 
discounting, as discussed in Section 3), the market prices, and the estimated costs of requiring, 
these more efficient products will be higher than if consumers evaluated future cost savings 
using exponential discounting.7  
Once we begin to consider the monetary valuation of nonmarket outcomes, the potential 
distinction between rational and irrational choices, and choices and welfare, increases in 
importance. Social programs are generally targeted on improving individual and societal welfare. 
If individuals’ behavior suggests preferences that appear irrational, unstable, or contrary to their 
                                                 
4 In its simplest form, neoclassical theory assumes perfect information. However, an entire field has developed 
within the standard model around the economics of information, including topics such as decision making under 
uncertainty, insurance, the optimal acquisition of costly information, and the effects of information asymmetries 
(e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard). 
5 See, for example, Diamond and Vartiainen (2007), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Congdon, Kling, and 
Mullainathan (2011). 
6 See, for example, Bernheim and Rangel (2007) for discussion of the implications of behavioral research for 
addiction programs. 
7 See, for example, Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) for discussion of the implications of behavioral research for 
energy policy. 
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self-interest, we face difficult decisions. We could use the resulting values (or a range of values) 
in our analysis regardless, we could explore the effects of providing more education or 
experience, or we could substitute expert judgment. Each of these options raises thorny practical 
and philosophical issues. 
In this paper, we take the perspective that analysts should avoid making judgments about 
whether values are “rational” or “irrational,” but should make every effort to ensure that studies 
are designed to elicit well-informed, thoughtful preferences. We use the terms “mistakes” or 
“errors” to reflect choices that diverge from how an individual would define his or her own 
preferences given perfect information, full reflection, and self-control, absent the biases that may 
result from cognitive or emotional challenges. While such perfection in decisionmaking may be 
impossible in reality, our hope is to at least attempt to avoid paternalistic views of what 
individuals “should” prefer, deferring instead to the preferences individuals express when 
provided opportunities for contemplation and learning. In other words, we maintain the 
traditional reliance on individuals’ own definition of their welfare, while recognizing that 
education and experience may be needed to aid them in developing this definition. 
Data limitations play an important role in benefit-cost analyses, particularly in valuing 
nonmarket effects. The research base rarely includes studies that address an outcome that is 
identical in all respects to the outcome of a particular social policy. Time and resource 
constraints mean that analysts are generally unable to conduct new primary valuation research. 
Instead, they follow the benefit-transfer framework, which involves taking values developed in 
one context (a primary research study or group of studies) and applying them in a somewhat 
dissimilar context (the policy analysis) based on careful review of the literature. While values 
may be adjusted to reflect differences in the characteristics of the outcomes or the affected 
population, the available research is often insufficient to support quantitative adjustment. These 
differences are frequently addressed in more qualitative terms. Analysts can explore the resulting 
uncertainty using sensitivity or probabilistic analysis, or by examining breakeven values; i.e., the 
values at which the benefits of a policy no longer exceed its costs, or at which the ranking of the 
policy options changes. Because using multiple values and/or discussing these issues 
qualitatively can complicate presentation of the results, analysts need to carefully summarize the 
implications for busy decisionmakers. 
In the sections that follow, we begin by discussing several issues related to the 
implications of behavioral research for defining what it is that we are trying to measure, 
regardless of whether we are conducting primary research or reviewing studies for benefit 
transfer. In Section 2, we focus specifically on benefits, considering how behavioral research 
might affect the attributes included in nonmarket valuation studies. In Section 3, we turn to the 
discounting of future costs and benefits to reflect their timing. Section 4 discusses the distinction 
between private and social preferences. In Section 5, we turn to issues related to the quality of 
valuation studies, considering how behavioral research might affect their design and 
implementation. 
Section 6 concludes by looking at the more general implications of behavioral 
economics. Practitioners often advocate benefit-cost analysis as a positive, descriptive exercise, 
that investigates what individuals would prefer (given the current distribution of income and 
other baseline conditions) and summarizes the results. Substituting expert judgment for observed 
choices is a slippery slope: there is often no clear dividing line between irrational and rational 
decisions or stable and unstable preferences. Behavior that appears irrational or unstable on the 
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surface may in fact reflect an underlying rationality; the problem may be that the investigator 
simply has not discovered or does not understand the rationale.8 
Benefit-cost analysis can be viewed as a normative exercise even within this traditional 
framework. For example, Adler and Posner (2006) describe BCA as “applied moral philosophy” 
(p. 4) and Just et al. (2004) argue that welfare economics is normative because it “is concerned 
with what ‘ought’ to be” (p. 3). Regardless, substituting experts’ or others’ beliefs about what 
individual preferences “should” be firmly moves benefit-cost analysis into the normative realm 
(see Hammitt 2009). However, as Smith (2007) notes, experts make mistakes too, and there is no 
consensus on whose expert judgment should prevail. As discussed in Section 6, we advocate a 
pragmatic view of these analyses as attempting to reflect the thoughtful, well-informed 
preferences of those affected to the greatest extent possible. 
 
2. VALUING PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES 
 
The value of the benefits of social programs – such as those targeted on reducing crime, 
increasing education, improving housing, or decreasing environmental, health, or safety risks –
frequently cannot be fully captured by directly referencing market behavior. Instead, these values 
are estimated through revealed- and stated-preference research. Revealed-preference studies use 
data from market transactions or observed behavior to estimate the value of related nonmarket 
goods, while stated-preference studies involve asking respondents how they would behave in a 
hypothetical market. Regardless of whether they are conducting new primary research or 
transferring values from existing studies, analysts need to start with a clear definition of the key 
attributes of the outcome of interest. In this section, we discuss how behavioral research might 
affect the attributes that analysts consider important. 
 Behavioral economics highlights ways in which psychological responses may lead to 
values that appear irrational or inconsistent with the standard economic model. The seminal work 
on these anomalies is encapsulated by Prospect Theory (proposed in Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), which suggests that preferences depend on: (1) the reference point from which they are 
measured; (2) whether the change is a loss or a gain (with losses valued more than gains); (3) the 
distance from the reference point (with changes valued less if farther away); and (4) whether the 
probability is large or small (with small probabilities overweighted ).9 
The importance of psychological concerns also has been long recognized in traditional 
research. For example, numerous studies have explored how risk perception affects the valuation 
of mortality risks, leading individuals to value risks of the same outcome and magnitude 
differently depending on their cause. Much of this work builds on research summarized in Slovic 
(1987), which suggests that individuals are more likely to want to see a risk reduced if it is more 
dreaded (i.e., perceived as more uncontrollable, catastrophic, likely to be fatal, inequitable, risky 
to future generations, difficult to reduce, risk increasing (rather than decreasing), and/or 
involuntary). Individuals also have a greater desire for addressing risks that are unknown or 
unfamiliar (i.e., that are unobservable, unknown to those exposed, new, unknown to science, or 
have delayed effects). 
                                                 
8 Smith and Moore (2010) note that: “[d]ecisions that appear incoherent or contradictory may simply reflect the 
analysts’ failure to fully specify the constraints to choice.” (p. 226) These constraints include factors such cognitive 
capacity, the energy available for decisionmaking, and physical dexterity, as well as budget constraints.  
9 More generally, related scholarship indicates that changes in probability near zero or one are overweighted and 
changes in intermediate probabilities are underweighted.  
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 The effects of psychological responses on valuation, and the types of nonmarket 
outcomes associated with social programs, are too diverse for us to be comprehensive here.10 
Instead, we begin by addressing the distinction between willingness to pay (WTP) and 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation. This distinction is fundamental to valuation in 
almost every context and has been identified by several scholars as an area where behavioral 
economics has significant implications. We then consider the valuation of mortality risk 
reductions in light of behavioral findings related to psychological attributes and the interpretation 
of probabilities. We use mortality risk reductions as an example both because they are an 
important outcome of many social programs and because their value has been relatively well-
studied. 
 
2.1 Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept Compensation 
 
WTP and WTA can be used to value beneficial or harmful changes. For a beneficial outcome, 
WTP represents the maximum amount of money an individual would be willing to give up in 
exchange for the amenity, while WTA represents the minimum amount he would need to be paid 
to forego, rather than gain, the amenity. For a harmful outcome, WTP is the maximum an 
individual would pay to avoid the harm, and WTA is the minimum he would require to accept 
the harm. Under conventional assumptions, Willig (1976) demonstrates that these values should 
be similar as long as income effects are negligible; i.e., if purchases of the good represent a small 
proportion of income and if changes in income do not lead to large changes in demand. Willig’s 
analysis pertains to private goods, where the individual chooses the quantity to purchase. For 
public goods, where the individual cannot choose the quantity, Hanemann (1991) finds that WTP 
and WTA may diverge significantly when there are no private goods that are good substitutes for 
the public good.  
 A number of empirical studies have found substantial differences between WTP and 
WTA (see, for example, Horowitz and McConnell 2002).11 Behavioral economists argue that 
these differences cannot be fully explained by income and substitution effects. Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) and several subsequent studies highlight the implications of Prospect 
Theory for this divergence, identifying it as a major concern for benefit-cost analysis.  
In particular, Knetsch (2005, 2010) notes that behavioral studies indicate that WTP and 
WTA differ due to the combined effects of two factors. First, values depend on whether 
individuals view the reference state as their present status or as their status after the change. 
Second, they will value the change more highly if it is viewed as a loss from this reference state 
rather than as a gain. This means that, if the reference state is one’s current status, WTP for a 
gain will be smaller than WTA for a loss of the same magnitude. If the reference point is instead 
one’s future status, Knetsch argues that WTP and WTA will be between the values found if 
current status is used as the reference state. 
                                                 
10 We do not discuss research on happiness (or life satisfaction) in detail. Several scholars have suggested that these 
approaches should replace the use of WTP or WTA measures in BCA (see, for example, Kahneman and Sugden 
2005 and Layard 2010 as well as the August 2008 special issue of the Journal of Public Economics). However, more 
work is needed to improve related research methods, collect empirical data, and assess the implications for policy 
analysis. For a thoughtful critique of related issues, see Smith (2008). 
11 This issue arises primarily in stated-preference studies. As discussed in Smith and Moore (2010), hedonic models 
(such as those examining wage-risk trade-offs to estimate the value of mortality risks) result in point estimates of 
marginal WTP based on equilibrium conditions. Information on discrete changes is needed to detect disparities 
between WTP and WTA.  
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This divergence raises the question of which measure is most appropriate for policy 
analysis. Traditionally, many economists argue that, because WTP and WTA differ in their 
starting points, the choice of measure should be based on property rights.12 If the property right 
is associated with the status quo, then WTP to obtain an improvement is the correct measure. If 
the property right is instead associated with the change, then WTA to forgo the improvement is 
the correct measure. However, particularly for nonmarket goods, these property rights are often 
not well-defined. In addition, the legal definitions of rights may not correspond with how 
individuals identify the starting point when assessing changes in their own welfare. In particular
they may view the status quo as the more intuitive basis for valuing the changes associa
implementation of new social programs.  
, 
ted with 
                                                
Once a reference state is established, differing values could be applied depending on 
whether a policy results in a gain or a loss from that state. However, as discussed in Guria et al. 
(2005) and elsewhere, this approach could lead to recommendations that vary depending on the 
perspective: an ex ante evaluation of a proposed program could support a differing conclusion 
than an ex post evaluation of an existing program; a proposal to introduce a program could be 
evaluated differently than a proposal to abolish a program. When the individuals who benefit 
from a policy change are the ones to bear the costs, it seems illogical for the evaluation of the 
policy to depend on the reference point. In addition, if a program involves both losses and gains, 
the use of different values could lead to counterintuitive results. For example, if a policy reduces 
mortality risks for some and increases them for others, the use of differing values could lead to 
rejection (on efficiency grounds) of a proposal that saves more lives, or could favor a proposal 
that saves fewer lives but has higher net benefits, depending on how the risks are allocated across 
the different groups (Hammitt and Treich 2007). The extent to which these sorts of problems 
arise will depend on the extent to which the values vary when viewed from these differing 
perspectives; for many outcomes these differences have not yet been well-studied. 
Much of the work identifying the behavioral anomalies that may underlie the divergence 
between WTP and WTA measures has been conducted in a laboratory setting with students as 
subjects, so often lacks the types of feedback mechanisms associated with real world exchanges. 
In addition, laboratory experiments usually involve exchanges of relatively simple goods 
(money, coffee mugs) that lack the multiple attributes associated with the outcomes of social 
programs. For more complex (and often less familiar) nonmarket goods, differences between 
WTP and WTA measures may be driven at least in part by attributes of the outcomes themselves 
for which sufficient controls are not included in the data analysis and by challenges related to 
how the values are elicited or measured, as well as by loss aversion and other behavioral 
anomalies. Thus more study is needed to understand why WTP and WTA estimates diverge for 
particular types of outcomes and to estimate the size of the difference.  
 Policy analysts often focus on WTP estimates for more practical reasons, including 
skepticism about WTA estimates that appear implausibly large.13 The extent to which these 
differences stem from problems with the data and methods used for nonmarket valuation, rather 
than from the sorts of concerns noted above, remains unclear. One particular methodological 
 
12 More precisely, these measures are based on the concepts of compensating and equivalent variation (or 
compensating and equivalent surplus for public goods). The two measures differ in their starting points: for a 
beneficial outcome, compensating variation references the level of utility without the improvement, while equivalent 
variation references the level with the improvement. For more discussion of the relationship to property rights, see 
Freeman (2003).  
13 This preference for WTP estimates due to perceived WTA measurement problems is reflected in current 
guidelines, such as OMB (2003). 
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challenge arises from the relationship of these measures to income. Because WTP cannot exceed 
an individual’s ability to pay (e.g., income or wealth), stated-preference researchers can remind 
respondents to consider their budget constraints and can identify values that appear unrealistic 
given reported income levels. In contrast, WTA amounts are unconstrained, and may lead 
respondents to overstate what they would in fact accept when hypothetical surveys are used to 
elicit values. Large values also may be reported as protest bids when respondents do not accept 
the scenario presented by the researchers. Estimates of WTA that are consistent with an 
underlying utility function can be obtained instead using a preference-calibration approach 
(Smith et al. 2006).  
 Thus more research is needed to examine the extent to which WTP and WTA estimates 
are likely to diverge for the particular outcomes of concern in benefit-cost analyses of social 
programs. In the interim, analysts can test the sensitivity of their findings to variation in these 
values. For example, if the benefits analysis relies on WTP estimates but consideration of the 
reference state and loss aversion suggests that WTA may be more appropriate, then the analyst 
may wish to test the impact of larger values on the results. 
  
2.2 Psychological Responses to Risk 
 
Behavioral research has many other potentially significant implications for the attributes 
considered in nonmarket valuation, including how risks are perceived and valued. Some of these 
issues relate to the cognitive processing of risk information, including the misinterpretation of 
probabilities and the tendency to rely on simple heuristics or decision rules. In this section, we 
focus more directly on underlying preferences, while recognizing that it can be very difficult to 
distinguish “real” from “mistaken” choices or values. We illustrate these issues using research on 
the value of small mortality risk reductions. 
Typically, the value for mortality risks is expressed as the value per statistical life (VSL). 
The VSL represents the value of small risk changes (e.g., of 1 in 10,000) in a defined time 
period, expressed as a “statistical” life for convenience – it is not the value of saving an 
individual’s life with certainty.14 The VSL has been estimated in over 60 revealed-preference 
studies (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) and over 70 stated-preference studies (Lindhjem et al. 2010); 
the implications of these studies have been assessed in numerous literature reviews and meta-
analyses as well as in guidance for regulatory analyses.15 
There is substantial evidence that both personal characteristics and risk characteristics 
affect the VSL; its variation is not limited to the potential differences between WTP and WTA 
discussed above. The influence of personal characteristics (such as income or age) can be 
described at least in part by standard economic theory, such as the lifecycle consumption model 
(see for example, Hammitt 2007, Hammitt and Robinson 2010). Risk characteristics include both 
physical attributes (such as whether the risk is latent or involves significant morbidity prior to 
death) and psychological attributes (such as whether the risk is perceived as voluntarily incurred 
or under an individual’s control). Research on the effects of these perceptions suggests that 
individuals may value risks of the same expected magnitude (e.g., 1 in 10,000) and same 
outcome (e.g., immediate death) differently if they stem from causes that are viewed differently. 
                                                 
14 In other words, the VSL is equal to individual WTP for a small risk change in a defined time period, divided by 
the risk change; it is the local slope of an indifference curve between risk and wealth (see Hammitt 2000). 
15 See, for example, the meta-analyses in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Lindhjem et al. (2010), the reviews in 
Robinson (2008b) and Robinson and Hammitt (2009), and the guidance in EPA (2000) and OMB (2003). 
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More work is needed to better understand how these perceptions affect valuation; however, the 
available empirical evidence suggests that risks viewed as less controllable, voluntary, or 
familiar, or as more feared or ambiguous, may be valued up to twice as much as other risks 
(Robinson et al. 2010). 
This variation is not necessarily inconsistent with the standard economic model: changes 
in attributes are expected to lead to changes in value. However, some research findings illustrate 
the influence of the types of anomalies emphasized by behavioral economists. First, when faced 
with uncertain risk information, individuals respond differently than when faced with a point 
estimate equivalent to the expected value of the range, reflecting ambiguity aversion.16 For 
example, work by Viscusi et al. (1991), Shogren (2005), and Riddel and Shaw (2006) suggests 
that WTP for fatal or nonfatal risk reductions increases as risk ambiguity increases. Second, 
research shows that individuals tend to overweight small risks (particularly when they are 
viewed as fearsome), consistent with Prospect Theory (see, for example, the review in 
Johansson-Stenman 2008). Third, individuals are often insensitive to changes in small risks, 
reporting the same or similar values for risks that differ in magnitude (see, for example, Hammitt 
and Graham 1999, Corso et al. 2001, Robinson and Hammitt 2009). Although these findings may 
in part reflect misunderstanding or miscommunication of the risks being valued, they may also 
reflect stable or “real” underlying preferences. 
These anomalies do not necessarily create problems for the analyst. Ideally, the values 
used in benefit-cost analysis would reflect all of the attributes of the risk, including the ambiguity 
and fear associated specifically with that risk (see, for example, Robinson et al. 2010). However, 
in some cases, this may mean that the analyst would need to test a wide range of values either 
because of deficiencies in the research base or because of uncertainty regarding the applicability 
of the results. 
Insensitivity to risk changes may be particularly troubling. Economic theory suggests that 
WTP should increase almost proportionately to the size of the risk change, as long as the change 
is small, which means that the VSL would be nearly constant. If instead, for example, individuals 
report that they are willing to pay $700 per year for both a 5 in 10,000 and a 1 in 10,000 annual 
risk reduction, this translates into a VSL ranging from $1.4 million to $7 million – a wide 
enough range to potentially affect whether a policy appears cost-beneficial. One possible 
explanation may be that individuals are indifferent between risk changes of these magnitudes. 
However, as discussed in Corso et al. (2001), it appears more likely that this result reflects 
misinterpretation of the probabilities, which can be reduced by using visual aids that more 
effectively communicate the size of the change. While many studies that use these aids find 
increased sensitivity to risk magnitude, some continue to find a degree of insensitivity (e.g., 
Alberini et al. 2004). However, it may be preferable to use this sensitivity as a criteria for 
evaluating the quality of the studies for benefit-transfer, rather than assuming that it reflects 
indifference between risk changes of these magnitudes. More generally, differences between the 
risks studied and the risks associated with various social policies will lead to uncertainty in the 
estimates, the implications of which will need to be addressed in the analysis.  
Our focus on mortality risks skirts some difficult questions, which we believe cannot be 
answered definitively. For example, there is substantial evidence that individuals’ evaluations 
                                                 
16 In his seminal work on this topic, Ellsberg (1961) notes that ambiguity depends on the amount, type, reliability, 
and unanimity of information on probabilities and the resulting degree of confidence one has in the data. He 
indicates that many people prefer payments that they will receive with certainty to those that are uncertain, even 
when the uncertain outcome has a higher expected value. 
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differ before, during, and after an experience (e.g., Kahneman 2000a, 2000b). This means that, 
for example, the values for reducing the risk of a particular injury or illness may depend on 
whether the individual has experienced that health effect. One could argue it is the prospective, 
ex ante perspective of the inexperienced, healthy individual that matters in policy analysis, 
assuming that the goal of the policy is to help the currently healthy person avoid transitioning 
into the less healthy state.17 Alternatively, one could argue that the experienced, ill individual is 
better informed and hence his or her values should be used. A third choice could involve 
somehow integrating values across inexperienced and experienced health states over time. These 
sorts of debates again argue for using a range of values in benefit-cost analysis, to determine how 
the differences affect the results. 
 
2.3 Conclusions and Implications 
 
The first step in valuing any outcome involves defining it, including both its physical and 
psychological characteristics. Behavioral economics suggests a number of attributes that may be 
worth investigating when valuing the nonmarket benefits of social programs. Assuming that our 
goal is to provide information on the amount of money that affected individuals would be willing 
to trade for the outcome of concern, it seems appropriate to examine the effects of these 
attributes regardless of whether the results appear consistent with the standard economic model; 
the findings may provide important insights. While inconsistencies in policy recommendations 
could potentially arise when such context-dependent values are used in benefit-cost analysis, it is 
difficult to determine the importance of these inconsistencies without more information on the 
extent to which values might vary. 
As we discuss in more detail later, addressing these issues in part requires ensuring that 
valuation studies are well-designed, to help separate values that reflect misinformation or 
misunderstanding from values that reflect more stable and carefully-considered preferences. 
However, we also need more research that tests the effects of these attributes on valuation, so 
that we are better able to sort out what is and is not important in different contexts, as well as 
determine the extent to which they are outweighed or counterbalanced by other considerations. 
For example, it is unclear whether differences between WTP and WTA are more or less 
important than whether a mortality risk is particularly feared or ambiguous. Regardless of 
whether we view these issues from a traditional or behavioral perspective, our understanding of 
how nonmarket values vary in different contexts is incomplete. 
Two types of research would be helpful. First, because the effects of different attributes 
are interrelated, studies are needed that consider them jointly – holistically assessing the specific 
outcome of concern. Second, studies that consider the effects of varying attributes one-by-one 
are also useful, because they provide insights that can be used to make adjustments (or to 
calibrate results) when benefit transfers are conducted. These studies should investigate the 
                                                 
17 When assessing the cost-effectiveness of health policies and medical interventions, recommendations for best 
practices suggest that, while descriptions of health states should be based on information from patients or others 
familiar with the condition, preferences for different health states should be based on the community or societal 
perspective. One way of describing the desirability of this perspective “...is to imagine that we are looking at the 
world before we are born, or at least before we encounter any serious health problems, and to ask what kind of world 
we would like it to be. In that “ex ante” position we would not yet know what health problems we were destined to 
develop – only that there was some chance that we might develop any of them” (Gold et al. 2006, p. 7). Similar 
recommendations have been developed for cost-effectiveness analysis of environmental, health, and safety 
regulations (Institute of Medicine 2006). 
14 
 
October 2010 Revised Draft 
extent of heterogeneity in the population as well, to determine whether changes in attributes are 
perceived and valued similarly by different individuals. 
Such studies can take years to complete, and funding for nonmarket valuation work is 
very limited. In the absence of conclusive empirical research, analysts will need to carefully 
describe the potential implications of differences between the study and policy outcome when 
interpreting benefit-cost analysis results, including both factors that are, and are not, consistent 
with the standard economic model. We expect that analysts will continue to use the benefit-
transfer framework to explore the effects of context differences both quantitatively and 
qualitatively; using sensitivity, breakeven, or probabilistic analysis where appropriate to test the 
implications of related uncertainties.  
In conclusion, we recommend that analysts avoid making a priori judgments about 
whether values appear “rational” or “stable,” and instead consider the following. 
 
1) Studies should be designed to test the effects of the psychologically-salient attributes 
found in behavioral research on benefit values, as well as the effects of other physical and 
psychological attributes. 
2) Such studies should consider both the holistic effect of the full range of attributes relevant 
to a particular context, and the effects of varying the attributes one-by-one to develop 
adjustments for transferring values to other contexts. 
3) Values should be not be rejected unless the study does not meet basic criteria for quality 
or adhere to generally-accepted principles for best practices. Rejected values, and the 
basis for rejecting them, should be clearly documented. 
4) When values are uncertain, sensitivity, probabilistic, or breakeven analysis should be 
used to test the effects of this uncertainty on the results. 
5) Where quantitative estimates are not available, the potential effects of both 
psychologically-salient and physical attributes should be discussed qualitatively. 
 
3. ESTIMATING TIME PREFERENCES 
 
Evaluating the benefits and costs of social programs often involves comparing impacts that occur 
in different time periods, using discounting to reflect time preferences. The main distinction 
between the traditional approach to discounting and the results of behavioral research is whether 
outcomes are discounted at a constant exponential rate or hyperbolically. This distinction reflects 
simplifying assumptions rather than theoretical differences. Exponential discounting can be 
traced to Samuelson’s (1937) work on discounted utility, which was intended to highlight certain 
theoretical relationships. Samuelson himself recognized that his assumptions were a 
simplification, neither necessarily predictive of actual behavior nor associated with a normative 
view of welfare. More recent work (Weitzman 2001) suggests that hyperbolic discounting is 
appropriate under the standard economic model when the discount rate is uncertain.18 Gollier 
and Zeckhauser (2005) also discuss theoretical reasons why aggregating individual discount ra
will lead to a rate that decreases over time. Thus the distinction that we explore in this section 
relates more to practical application than to theory. Figure 2 provides an example of exponential, 
hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic functions. 
tes 
                                                
 
 
18 This results because the discount factor [1/(1+r)t] is a nonlinear function of the discount rate r over time t, so the 
expected value of the discount factor corresponds to smaller values of r as t increases. 
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Figure 2. Exponential, Hyperbolic, and Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Functions (based on Berns et al. (2007) 
Figure 1.) 
 
 
Discounting is another area where behavioral economics as well as other research 
emphasizes the need to clearly define what it is that we are trying to measure. If discounting is 
intended to reflect real resource expenditures, then relying on market rates seems appropriate. 
These rates measure what an investment might otherwise earn on average; i.e., the opportunity 
costs of diverting funds to a particular social program. However, if market imperfections lead to 
significant divergence between these rates and aggregated or average individual preferences, 
then further examination of these preferences may be desirable. 
One problem that arises in examining this possible divergence is the difficulty of 
disentangling the effect of timing from the effects of other characteristics of an outcome, such as 
the reference dependence and loss aversion discussed earlier. Frederick et al. (2002) note that, 
for a given time delay, the empirical evidence suggests that rates vary depending on the context: 
“(1) gains are discounted more than losses; (2) small amounts are discounted more than large 
amounts; (3) greater discounting is shown to avoid delay of a good than to expedite its receipt; 
(4) in choices over sequences of outcomes, improving sequences are often preferred to declining 
sequences though positive time preference dictates the opposite; and (5) in choices over 
sequences, violations of independence are pervasive, and people seem to prefer spreading 
consumption over time in a way that diminishing marginal utility alone cannot explain” (p. 362). 
As they note, these problems relate more to how the utility function is specified than to the 
discount rate. To avoid redundancy, below we focus on the effects of timing alone, while 
recognizing that the dividing line between pure time preferences and other types of preferences is 
somewhat murky. 
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 In this discussion, we address discounting of the monetary value of costs and benefits, not 
the underlying physical impacts. To the extent that timing affects the value of these physical 
outcomes, its impact is best represented by using their time-specific monetary value rather than 
by adjusting the discount rate. For example, if latent health effects are valued differently than 
effects experienced immediately, this difference should be reflected in the unit values applied to 
the health effects at the time they manifest, which then can be discounted at the same rate as 
other monetary amounts included in the analysis. 
 The time period over which an analysis is conducted has important implications for 
discounting. We concentrate here on discounting annual quantities over an intra-generational 
time period, consistent with the likely time frame of interest for analyses of social programs. We 
do not discuss the additional complications that arise when assessing programs (such as climate 
change or nuclear-waste storage) where inter-generational impacts are of major importance. 
Below, we first briefly review the traditional exponential approach, then discuss the evidence 
from behavioral economics and describe the implications. 
 
3.1 Exponential Discounting 
 
Time can influence the value of costs and benefits in a variety of different ways. Outcomes 
further in the future may be more uncertain or risky; new opportunities, information, or 
technologies may arise while current options may disappear; and an individual’s preferences may 
change as he or she ages. In theory, discounting as traditionally implemented should not reflect 
any of these factors (which may be addressed separately elsewhere in the analysis); it should 
simply reflect the “pure” effect of timing. 
Typically, benefit-cost analysis is conducted with constant discount rates (using the same 
rate for both costs and benefits), although rates that change over time have been used in some 
cases for longer-term impacts.19 Exponential (i.e., constant-rate) discounting assumes that time 
preferences are constant over different periods.20  
For government analyses of social programs, rates are established by OMB in Circular A-
94 (1992) and Circular A-4 (2003); the former focuses more on government programs while the 
latter focuses on economically-significant regulations.21 Both suggest the use of exponential 
discounting, using a 7 percent real annual rate to approximate the average marginal pretax rate of 
return on private investments.22 Circular A-4 requires that analysts also report the results using a 
3 percent rate to reflect consumption time preferences (or the “social rate of time preference”).23 
OMB derives the 3 percent rate from the pretax rate of return on long-term government debt to 
                                                 
19 For example, the United Kingdom’s guidance for evaluation of public programs (HM Treasury 2003) suggests 
that declining discount rates be used for analyses that cover periods greater than 30 years. Wietzman (2001) also 
suggests declining rates for assessing climate change policies. 
20 This means that the present value (PV) of a benefit or cost (S) at time (t) using a discount rate (r) is calculated as 
PV = St/(1+r)t. 
21 Both Circulars note that the shadow price approach would be preferable but is not recommended due to 
difficulties in its implementation. In addition to discussing social programs, Circular A-94 also discusses rates to be 
used in analyses that reflect trade-offs within the Federal budget, which are based on Treasury borrowing rates and 
updated annually. 
22 All discount rates are reported as real rates, net of inflation. 
23 Three percent is also recommended as the base rate for cost-effectiveness analysis of health and medical 
interventions, with an alternative of 5 percent (for comparability with previous studies) and a range from zero to 7 
percent in sensitivity analysis (Gold et al. 1996). 
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approximate the interest paid on savings, assuming that the savings rate represents the average 
by which consumers discount future consumption. 
The use of two alternative rates reflects uncertainty about whether these programs 
primarily affect the allocation of capital or private consumption. In theory, the rates would not 
diverge in perfectly competitive markets, but in actuality economic distortions such as taxes lead 
to differences. Given this and other sources of uncertainty, OMB also requires that agencies 
provide a schedule that shows how the undiscounted costs and benefits will be distributed over 
time and discusses the use of alternative rates in sensitivity analysis. Thus the traditional 
approach for intra-generational discounting relies on a number of simplifying assumptions, and 
includes recommendations for testing these assumptions by considering the impact of alternative 
discount rates.  
   
3.2 Hyperbolic Discounting 
 
Time preferences have been one of the most active and well-developed components of 
behavioral economics research. As summarized in Chabris et al. (2008), numerous studies 
conducted over many years have found higher discount rates in the near-term than over the 
longer term. As a result, behavioral economists have explored hyperbolic functions with 
discounted values that drop steeply in the immediate future and more gently over the longer 
run.24 These functions are often described as “present-biased.” 
The exponential function is often described as the only discounting approach that yields 
dynamically consistent decisions.25 Under hyperbolic and other functions, the preferred choice 
can change solely because time passes. In other words, a project that appears desirable (e.g., the 
present value of its net benefits is positive) in time period 1 may appear undesirable (e.g., may 
have a negative net present value) in time period 2. As noted by Laibson (1997) “from today’s 
perspective, the discount rate between two far-off periods, t and t + 1, is the long-term low 
discount rate. However, from the time t perspective, the discount rate between t and t + 1 is the 
short-term high discount rate” (p. 445-446). This inconsistency is often referred to as a 
“preference reversal,” although it can perhaps be better characterized as a sort of tug-of-war 
between these two perspectives or “as a game between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves 
and a long-run patient self” (Fudenberg and Levine 2006, p. 1449). 
 Many of the studies that find declining rates were conducted in laboratory settings. In 
these experiments, a small number of subjects (often students) are offered choices between 
receiving differing amounts of money (or another reward, often small) sooner or later. Declining 
rates have also been found in some field studies that address real-world behavior. Frederick et al. 
(2002) list 42 studies conducted between 1978 and 2002, including 34 laboratory experiments 
and eight field studies. The number of studies is increasing rapidly. Laibson (2010) lists almost 
20 additional studies completed since 2002, including several conducted under field rather than 
laboratory conditions. 
The results are diverse. The studies reviewed by Frederick et al. imply annual discount 
rates ranging from zero to thousands of percent, based on data collected for timeframes as short 
as one day to as long as 25 years. Frederick et al. note that this lack of agreement reflects at least 
                                                 
24 Alternatives to the hyperbolic discounting model have been proposed by some to explain these research results, 
including subadditive discounting (Read 2001) and similarity relations (Rubenstein 2003). 
25 If preferences are characterized by date rather than distance from the present, hyperbolic discounting can be 
dynamically consistent (Harvey 1994). 
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in part the difficulties inherent in isolating pure time preferences from other (theoretically 
distinct) considerations.  
While many studies demonstrate hyperbolic discounting, this pattern appears to apply 
primarily to relatively short near-term time periods. Frederick et al. report that if they exclude 
studies with time horizons less than one year, discount rates no longer decline over time, 
clustering around an average annual discount factor of 0.8. This factor implies an annual 
discount rate of 25 percent, however, well above market rates. Frederick et al. note that the high 
rates may be due to the effects of several confounding factors that tend to bias the results of these 
studies upwards. 
Laibson et al. (2007) explore time preferences over the life-cycle more systematically, 
using a structural model with data on age-specific income, credit-card borrowing, marginal 
propensity to consume, retirement-wealth accumulations, household characteristics, mortality 
rates, and other factors. If they restrict their model to a single (exponential) function, they find an 
annual discount rate of about 16.7 percent. However, their modeling rejects this single rate 
hypothesis. Allowing a quasi-hyperbolic function, they find a short-term annualized discount rate 
of 39.5 percent and a long-term annualized rate of 4.3 percent. 
Behavioral economists have explored a number of motivations behind these patterns. The 
high near-term rates are often described as resulting from imperfect self-control, which leads 
individuals to seek immediate gratification even if it diverges from their own longer-term 
preferences.26 Examples of this behavior, such as eating dessert despite wanting to lose weight, 
are abundant. Individuals vary in the extent to which they correctly predict these types of 
problems. Researchers identify “sophisticated” consumers as those who are more fully aware of 
the potential for future self-control issues, while “naive” consumers are more likely to incorrectly 
predict their future behavior. Sophisticated consumers may implement self-control measures or 
use commitment devices (such as avoiding temptation or establishing penalties) to reinforce their 
self control. 
 
3.3 Conclusions and Implications 
 
Although most economists agree that discounting is needed, there is some disagreement on the 
appropriate rate for social programs even within the traditional approach to benefit-cost analysis. 
Conceptually, under this framework, the rate should reflect the opportunity cost of investing in 
the intervention of concern; i.e., the best alternative use of the funds. However, it is often unclear 
what types of investment or consumption are affected when particular social programs are 
implemented, leading to the widespread use of generic defaults for discount rates, ideally 
accompanied by sensitivity analysis. 
 Traditionally, benefit-cost analysis involves discounting the monetary values of future 
impacts at a constant exponential rate, with real rates often in the range of 3 percent to 7 percent 
annually. Behavioral economics suggests that discounting instead follows a hyperbolic pattern, 
with varying rates. These findings pose three challenges for analysts: (1) they suggest significant 
differences between short- and long-term discount rates; (2) they suggest that discounting should 
be hyperbolic rather exponential; (3) they suggest that individual behavior indicates time 
preferences that may differ from market rates. 
                                                 
26 As discussed in Berns et al. (2007) and Chabris et al. (2008), behavioral economists are also exploring the 
potential neurological basis of the tendency to discount hyperbolically. 
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 In the context of social programs, rates reflecting a longer-term view appear more 
appropriate that the steep near-term rates found in behavioral research (regardless of whether 
they are exponential or hyperbolic) for two reasons. First, these programs are generally intended 
to operate over a several year period, which means that the planning horizon is consistent with 
longer-term rates. Second, these programs are focused on providing lasting (rather than 
temporary) improvements in welfare. To the extent that short-term rates reflect impulsive 
behavior and self-control problems (rather than more patient and thoughtful consideration), they 
are inconsistent with this goal. To reflect true improvements in social welfare, it appears 
desirable to focus on the time preferences that result from more careful assessment of long-range 
well-being.27 
As noted earlier, one source of tension between the rates traditionally used and the results 
from behavioral and other research on preferences relates to clearly defining what it is that we 
are trying to measure. Market rates indicate real resource costs, while behavioral research 
reflects preferences found in laboratory experiments or in field studies limited to particular 
market goods. (Stated-preference studies have also been used to explore discount rates.) These 
studies generally consider decisions made by individuals, while aggregate or average rates are 
needed for assessing social costs and benefits.28 These perspectives can be integrated if market 
rates are viewed as a reasonable approximation of preferences; i.e., if we assume that these rates 
reflect the aggregate of individual choices; that these choices reflect individual preferences; and 
that these preferences correspond to individual welfare.  
However, we believe that it is premature to recommend specific changes in the rates or 
functional forms used for discounting in benefit-cost analysis. While the reviews cited earlier 
compile the results of numerous studies, they do not evaluate these studies against criteria for 
quality or for applicability to social programs. Systematic review is needed both to determine the 
extent to which discount rates might decrease over time (and whether they may be close-to-
constant over the long run as suggested by Frederick et al.) and the extent to which they might 
differ from the 3 percent to 7 percent range now often used to represent market rates. 
 In the meantime, what advice can we provide our prototypical policy analyst? 
 
1) Analysts should provide a schedule of undiscounted costs and benefits, in the form of a 
bar chart (or other graphic) or a table, so that the decisionmaker can inspect this pattern. 
Simply summarizing costs and benefits as a net present value does not provide adequate 
information given related uncertainties. 
2) In choosing a discount rate or set of rates, as well as a functional form (exponential or 
hyperbolic) analysts must be clear about what, conceptually, they intend to represent for 
review by decisionmakers. The quality of the underlying data and related assumptions 
should also be described. 
                                                 
27 This does not mean that short-term rates should be completely ignored: they play an important role in predicting 
behavior separate from the discounting of costs and benefits, as noted in Section 1.2. 
28 We thank Kerry Smith for highlighting this point. 
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3) Analysts should consider the impact of alternative rates on their results, in particular 
emphasizing the discount rates at which benefits do, and do not, exceed costs, and/or at 
which the relative ranking of different policy options change.29 Comparing these switch 
points to rates reported in the empirical literature will provide insights into the 
implications of related uncertainties for decisionmaking. 
 
4. SEPARATING PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
 
While the outcomes of social programs vary in the extent to which they meet the economic 
definition of a public good (i.e., are non-rival and non-excludable), these programs differ from 
markets for private goods and services along several dimensions that are affected by how 
individuals view others when determining their own preferences. Although in its simplest form, 
the standard economic model assumes that individuals are primarily self-interested, other-
regarding preferences have been long-recognized within the traditional framework. As examples, 
we briefly discuss the treatment of altruistic motives, and note issues related to valuing a 
program rather than a private good and to assessing equity along with economic efficiency.  
Behavioral studies reinforce the importance of these types of considerations, suggesting 
that individuals often act selflessly. They also identify other types of interpersonal considerations 
that may affect preferences, including vengeful as well as welfare-enhancing motives. 
Behavioral research on these issues is less well-developed than research in the areas discussed 
previously, but provides potentially useful insights. 
 
4.1 Social Preferences within the Traditional Framework 
 
While self-interested preferences are a standard assumption of the most simplified version of the 
traditional economic model, scholars have long recognized that individuals also care about 
others’ welfare. Incorporating other-regarding preferences into benefit-cost analysis is difficult 
due to data limitations as well as conceptual challenges; however, related issues have been 
explored extensively within the traditional framework. 
In particular, the appropriate treatment of altruism has received substantial attention. 
Economic theory distinguishes between two forms. Pure, or non-paternalistic, altruism means 
that I respect the preferences of others: I value the benefits they receive and the costs they incur 
exactly the same as they do. In contrast, paternalistic altruism involves ignoring other’s 
preferences to some extent. If those affected by the costs and benefits of a policy are pure 
altruists, counting both their altruistic and private values in benefit-cost analysis simply scales 
the costs and benefits upwards without affecting the overall analytic conclusions, so that ignoring 
or including altruistic values leads to identical results (Jones-Lee 1991, Bergstrom 2006). If their 
altruism instead varies depending on the outcome (e.g., is greater for health than for other aspects 
of well-being) or depending on the individuals affected (e.g., is greater for poor individuals than 
for the wealthy), then it can affect the sign of net benefits.30 In particular, there is some evidence 
                                                 
29 In some cases, there may be more than one switch point (i.e., internal rate of return), depending on the distribution 
of costs and benefits over time.  
30 We follow the usual assumption that the values to be counted in the benefit-cost analyses are those held by the 
individuals who bear its costs and/or receive its benefits. Decisionmakers may, of course, have altruistic motives or 
other interests that differ from those of the affected individuals.  
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that health and longevity are viewed more paternalistically than most other goods (e.g., 
Jacobsson et al. 2007).  
Paternalistic motives also appear more plausible when inequalities exist: I may wish to 
help those in impaired health by funding a program that exceeds their willingness to pay for it 
(and decreasing my own consumption).31,32 Alternatively, selective paternalistic altruism could 
involve caring about the costs incurred by others rather than the risks they incur. For example, I 
may be willing to pay $75 for my own risk reductions plus $50 to offset the costs to poorer 
individuals, allowing them to use their funds for other purposes. In this case, the subsidy is a 
means to re-distribute the costs of the program without changing its total costs nor the value of 
the benefits that accrue. In these cases, the value may not be truly altruistic (i.e., reflect how I 
value these particular costs or benefits for others); it may instead reflect how I value the 
distribution of impacts. If this is the case, analysts will need to carefully distinguish general 
preferences for redistribution from preferences related to the outcome of concern.  
In more complex, real-world situations, determining whether and how the values of 
various outcomes are differentially affected by paternalistic altruism is a difficult task. For 
example, Viscusi, Magat, and Forrest (1988) demonstrate that individuals are willing to pay 
additional amounts to reduce the risks of insecticide poisoning to others. However, they note that 
extrapolating their results to other contexts is not appropriate because the analysis was 
exploratory, the contributions were hypothetical, and the values are likely to vary across 
contexts. Due to these sorts of challenges, altruistic values are typically not quantified when 
valuing nonmarket goods.33 
Another issue that is receiving increased attention is the difference between individual 
WTP for a “unit” of a particular good or service for private use versus WTP for a program that 
benefits the entire community of which the individual is a part. With purely self-regarding 
preferences, these values would be equal, if the outcomes are otherwise identical. However, 
while several stated-preference studies consider public programs rather than, or in addition to, 
private goods, they have not yet been reviewed systematically to provide insights into the extent 
to which the values vary. Because it is difficult to design a believable scenario that is identical in 
all respects other than whether the good is provided privately or to a community, determining the 
extent to which such values diverge is challenging. For example, to be otherwise comparable, a 
risk-reducing program would need to deliver the same expected risk reduction as the private 
option, and to be described in a way that avoids strategic bias (e.g., free-riding, protest bids, or 
overstatement due to the hypothetical nature of the payment).34 
 Finally, as traditionally practiced, benefit-cost analysis focuses on economic efficiency, 
supplemented at times by separate assessment of distributional equity. Advocates of this 
                                                 
31 We default to the usual convention of referring to WTP rather than both WTP and WTA for ease of presentation. 
See Section 2 for discussion of these measures. 
32 It is worth considering, in this case, whether those receiving the excess health benefits (e.g., poorer members of 
the population) would benefit more if the altruists were willing to provide an additional $50 in cash rather than 
spending it on risk reduction. 
33 One area where paternalistic values have been increasingly recognized is in valuing health risks to children; see, 
for example, Dockins et al. (2002). 
34 A related issue is whether adult WTP reflects only personal values or also incorporates values associated with the 
well-being of other household members regardless of their age. See Munro (2009) for discussion of related issues in 
the context of stated-preference studies. Similar issues may arise in revealed-preference studies. For example, 
researchers generally assume that VSL estimates from wage-risk studies represent individual values, but decisions to 
trade income for risk changes may represent a household decision and include consideration of other’s well-being. 
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separation between equity and efficiency suggest that programs designed primarily to achieve 
outcomes other than income redistribution should focus on maximizing net social welfare; taxes 
and similar strategies can then be used to more effectively achieve distributional goals.35 
However, if WTP for a particular outcome in part reflects altruistic motives (intentionally or 
inadvertently) that result from concerns about disparities, and this WTP is used in the analysis of 
efficiency, the results of the benefit-cost analysis will, at least in part, also reflect equity 
concerns.  
 Social programs can exacerbate or ameliorate current inequalities both directly 
(depending on who receives the benefits and who bears the costs) and indirectly (e.g., because 
improved health can lead to greater productivity and income). Proposals to weight costs and 
benefits to reflect equity concerns have generally not been accepted in the U.S. due to the lack of 
agreement on the appropriate weights as well as concerns about transparency.36 However, 
several scholars have proposed approaches for more rigorously assessing equity (e.g., Sunstein
2007, Adler 2008, Graham 2008, Farrow 2009, Loomis 2009, Zerbe 2009, Johansson-Stenman 
and Konow 2010). The feasibility and usefulness of these approaches have not yet been carefu
tested. However, they suggest that equity effects could be addressed in more detail within the 
traditional framework, in part by taking advantage of the existing research on social welfare 
functions, optimal taxation, the marginal utility of income, and related topics.  
 
lly 
                                                
 
4.2 Behavioral Research on Social Preferences 
 
The strong interest in altruism, in valuing public programs as well as private goods, and in 
developing proposals to better incorporate equity into benefit-cost analysis, are consistent to a 
large extent with the emerging behavioral research on social preferences. Both laboratory and 
field studies suggest that individuals frequently consider others’ welfare in decisionmaking. 
While this behavior is often altruistic, it may also involve acting reciprocally to reward or punish 
others. In addition, individuals may use others’ status as the baseline against which to assess 
their own well-being. 
Charness and Rabin (2002) discuss three types of models that could explain behaviors 
found in laboratory settings: “ ‘[d]ifference aversion models’ assume that players are motivated 
to reduce differences between theirs and others’ payoffs; ‘social-welfare models’ assume that 
people like to increase social surplus, caring especially about helping those (themselves or 
others) with low payoffs; reciprocity models assume that the desire to raise or lower others’ 
payoffs depends on how fairly those others are behaving” (p. 817-818). They conclude that their 
experimental results are consistent with the social welfare and reciprocity models, but suggest 
that difference aversion is less important, and indicate the need for further research. 
The evidence from experimental research may be limited, however, in the extent to which 
it predicts behavior in more complex situations. As summarized in DellaVigna (2009), the role of 
social preferences has been studied in some field settings, particularly charitable giving and 
employer-employee relationships. The results suggest varied motives and do not necessarily 
match the experimental findings. DellaVigna notes that it can be difficult to separate social 
preferences from strategic decisions such as responses to social pressures, or from the “warm 
 
35 In reality, such redistribution may be difficult to achieve due to administrative costs, political constraints, and 
other factors. 
36 Other countries appear more willing to implement equity weighting; for example, the United Kingdom suggests 
weighting by income level in policy analyses (HM Treasury 2003). 
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glow” associated with giving rather than with a particular outcome (see, for example, Kahneman 
and Knetsch 1992, Andreoni et al. 2008). Thus while behavioral research provides support for 
the presence of altruistic (as well as malevolent) preferences, it does not provide values that can 
be directly used in benefit-cost analysis. 
Finally, research also suggests that preferences are formed in part by interpersonal 
comparisons, indicating that private WTP will depend not only on one’s current endowment of 
income, health, and so forth, but also on how this endowment compares to that of others (see, for 
example, Luttmer 2005, Frank 2005, and Solnick and Hemenway 2005).37 This research 
suggests that positional concerns are stronger in some areas, and can lead to a sort of “arm
involving cyclical increases as each individual responds to positional changes made by others, 
ultimately leading to an oversupply of positional goods relative to other goods. 
s race” 
                                                
Substantially more research is needed to determine how these positional concerns affect 
the valuation of outcomes from social programs. The results of the few studies to-date are 
inconsistent. For example, Frank and Sunstein (2001) argue that ignoring the effects of relative 
income leads to benefit measures that are far too low, and suggest that the VSL estimates used in 
regulatory analysis may be significantly understated. However, Kneisner and Viscusi’s (2005) 
analysis of wage-risk trade-offs suggests that the opposite is true: relative position appears to 
have little effect on compensating wage differentials for mortality risks, and may decrease the 
VSL. 
 
4.3 Conclusions and Implications 
 
As indicated by the above discussion, practitioners have long struggled with how to represent 
social preferences (such as paternalistic altruism) in benefit-cost analysis, due to both research 
challenges and theoretical considerations. Behavioral research suggests additional ways in which 
concerns for others might affect valuation, such as reciprocating “good” and “bad” behavior or 
improving one’s relative position.  
The research on social preferences reinforces the discussion in Section 2 on the potential 
importance of psychological attributes in valuation. For example, reciprocity may affect how 
individuals value mortality risks from crime (or from dangerous working conditions or polluting 
industries) in comparison to risks viewed as more accidental or naturally-occurring; concerns 
about relative position may affect programs providing income transfers differently than programs 
promoting improved health. This research also foreshadows some of the issues in study design 
discussed in Section 5, emphasizing the need to be clear about whether values reflect only an 
individual’s private consumption or also reflect benefits to the household or community. To the 
extent that studies (intentionally or inadvertently) include other-regarding preferences related to 
disparities, the values used in the analysis of efficiency may incorporate some equity concerns, 
potentially blurring the distinction between the two types of analysis. 
Behavioral research on social preferences is not as well developed as the research 
discussed in the prior sections, in part because of the complex interactions between social 
preferences and social pressures as well as the difficulty of extrapolating from experimental 
results to more complex real-world behaviors. Thus it is hard to offer much concrete advice to 
policy analysts that can be implemented immediately. However, this research suggests that these 
 
37 Solnick and Hemenway (2005) trace this concern with relative position back to work by Thorstein Veblen in 1899 
and cite several theoretical treatments published since that time.  
24 
 
October 2010 Revised Draft 
issues should be considered both when valuing particular nonmarket outcomes and when 
considering the distributional and other consequences of social programs.  
 This discussion leads to two recommendations for our prototypical policy analyst. 
 
1) In addition to other psychological attributes, studies should be designed to test the effects 
of social preferences on benefit values, focusing on outcomes associated with social 
programs rather than private goods or services. 
2) When reviewing studies for benefit transfer, analysts should consider whether the results 
are likely to reflect other-regarding as well as private preferences, and discuss the 
implications for both the analysis of economic efficiency and its relationship to equity 
concerns. 
 
5. IMPROVING VALUATION STUDIES 
 
Thoughtful and well-informed preferences are desirable when valuing outcomes in policy 
analysis for several reasons. First, resources are limited, and decisions to divert these resources 
to achieving particular social goals warrant careful consideration. Given that there is no market 
to test the match between choices, preferences, and values for many of the outcomes associated 
with social programs, it seems that decisions to expend resources on these types of public goods 
should be justified with particular care. Interactions in real markets can provide various types of 
feedback and learning that may be lacking in nonmarket valuation studies, hence the studies may 
not capture market dynamics that could lead to more well-informed choices. However, in real 
markets firms face incentives to cater to consumer biases. They may also conceal information or 
provide misleading information to protect their market share or increase profits. Thus analysts 
need to recognize that review of market decisions could also lead to erroneous understanding of 
underlying consumer preferences. 
Second, these programs and policies are generally focused on achieving long-term 
improvements in welfare, suggesting that we want to value the outcomes based on individuals’ 
thoughtful assessment of how they might benefit over the long-run. Third, and perhaps most 
relevant for the purposes of this paper, behavioral research suggests that individuals may at times 
make “mistakes” or “errors” in expressing preferences or values, following simple decision rules 
or making choices that do not fully coincide with their assessment of their own welfare (see 
DellaVigna 2009 for a recent review).38 While researchers have developed a number of 
strategies to address these issues, studies must be carefully designed so that the results do not 
ultimately reflect the values held by the researcher rather than the individuals studied. 
                                                
 
5.1 Stated-Preference Research 
 
Stated-preference researchers have a long tradition of considering psychological factors in 
designing their studies, and behavioral concerns are well-integrated into related guidance. Early 
work by Mitchell and Carson (1989) on best practices discusses approaches for encouraging 
honest and meaningful responses and controlling biases that may result from strategic behavior. 
 
38 One underlying issue in this research is the effect of “constructed” preferences. Particularly when faced with 
unfamiliar goods, individuals are not likely to have pre-existing preferences. Rather, their preferences will be 
formed when related decisions are required. This raises the question of whether these preferences will then be stable 
over time and across different contexts, and of how education and experience relate to creating this stability. 
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In 1993, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) expert panel (chaired by 
Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow) issued guidelines for these studies in the context of natural 
resource damage assessment cases, particularly to assess nonuse values. They discuss several 
behavioral considerations, such as pretesting surveys to ensure that the responses are not biased 
by the desire to please an interviewer, and using a referendum format (rather than an open-ended 
valuation question or payment card) to alleviate problems related to framing. Since that time, 
substantial additional research has been conducted that provides insights into how to best 
conduct these studies. 
For example, in 2005 and again in 2010, the journal Environmental and Resource 
Economics published special issues that address these concerns. The 2005 issue includes seven 
articles on anomalies and stated-preference research (Braga and Starmer 2005, Guria et al. 2005, 
Hanley and Shogren 2005, Kahneman and Sugden 2005, Knetsch 2005, List 2005, Sugden 
2005a, and Sugden 2005b). For example, List finds that experienced market participants behave 
in ways that appear consistent with the traditional economic model, while those with less 
experience exhibit some of the anomalies found in laboratory studies. Hanley and Shogren 
describe many options for improving stated-preference research, such as using workshops to 
better inform respondents, allowing “maybe” responses to recognize that individuals may only 
know their preferences over a limited range, and including “cheap talk” that discourages free-
riding. Researchers are also increasingly using choice experiments that ask respondents to value 
varying combinations of attributes rather than a single outcome, to mimic market choices and 
avoid overly narrow framing of decisions. 
The 2010 issue deals specifically with behavioral economics, and includes several articles 
that provide insights for stated-preference research (particularly Carlsson 2010, Hepburn et al. 
2010, Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010, Knetsch 2010, Smith and Moore 2010, and Shogren 
et al. 2010). For instance, Carlsson notes that while stated-preference researchers have much to 
learn from behavioral economics, behavioral economists can also learn from stated-preference 
research. He discusses four topics: revealed versus normative preferences (see Section 5.2), 
learning and constructed preferences, context dependence, and hypothetical bias. He indicates, 
for example, the importance of providing opportunities for learning, including practice and 
repetition. He also notes that while comparing results from studies with real and hypothetical 
payouts can be useful, there are several reasons for exercising caution in these comparisons.  
 The proliferation of these types of articles suggests that the intersection between 
behavioral research and the conduct of stated preference studies is fertile ground, with abundant 
lessons for researchers. However, it also means that there is a need to integrate the results of the 
numerous new studies to provide updated guidelines for best practices, that include guidance on 
how to best tailor stated-preference studies to different contexts and outcomes. 
 
5.2 Revealed-Preference Research 
 
The issues raised by behavioral research also affect revealed-preference studies. In particular, 
Beshears et al. (2008) distinguish between revealed (or positive) preferences (the choices people 
actually make) and normative preferences (the choices people think they should make). They 
note that actual choices result from combining normative preferences with the sorts of 
decisionmaking biases and anomalies found in behavioral research. 
 While Beshears et al. focus largely on how revealed and normative preferences diverge in 
savings and investment decisions, their findings have implications for many other contexts. They 
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identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity: (1) passive choice (acceptance of 
defaults); (2) complexity (delayed choice, avoidance of complicated options, or 
misunderstanding of options due to cognitive difficulties); (3) limited personal experience (lack 
of learning through feedback); (4) third-party marketing (manipulating preferences); and (5) 
intertemporal choice (inconsistent time preferences, discussed in Section 3). 
Beshears et al. then describe six approaches that can, in combination, help identify 
normative preferences: 
 
...“Structural estimation specifies a positive model with a precise set of economic and 
psychological motives (perhaps including non-Bayesian thinking and other decision-
making errors). This model is then estimated using data, and the resulting positive 
preferences are mapped into normative preferences using normative axioms. 
Active decisions eliminate some biases generated by default regimes. Under an 
active decision regime, individuals are required to explicitly state their preference 
without being influenced by (or being able to rely on) a default option. In some 
circumstances, this preference elicitation will be more reliable and more socially efficient 
than allowing consumers to express their preferences by opting into or out of a pre-
chosen default. 
In most stationary economic environments, initial choices are likely to be further 
from normative optimality than choices made after many periods of experience. One 
should therefore give more weight to asymptotic choices when attempting to infer 
normative preferences. 
When homogeneous individuals make noisy, error-prone decisions, their 
individual decisions do not reflect normative preferences, but their aggregate behavior 
can. Hence, normative preferences can sometimes be inferred from the central tendencies 
of aggregated preferences. 
Self-reported preferences reveal something about an agent's goals and values. 
Normative economics should allow self-reports to have some standing. This is 
particularly true when self-reports can be used to distinguish confident consumer 
decisions from decisions that were made in a state of confusion. 
Informed opinions come in two forms. External observers may offer expert 
advice, and decision-makers may themselves gain more expertise when they receive 
training or education. When trained/educated decision-makers make a choice, we call this 
an informed preference. Economists measuring normative preferences should give 
disproportionate weight to the actors who are most likely to know what they are doing.” 
(Beshears et al. 2008, p. 1793). 
 
When revealed-preference studies are used to value nonmarket outcomes, researchers 
first identify a market good that includes the nonmarket outcome as one of its attributes. They 
then apply statistical methods to distinguish the value of the nonmarket outcome from the value 
of other attributes. For example, they may look at the trade-off between wages and job-related 
risks to value mortality risk reductions, or at residential decisions, recreational choices, or 
purchases of consumer goods to value various nonmarket attributes (see Freeman 2003 for more 
detailed examples). It seems sensible to consider whether both the market outcome and 
preferences toward the nonmarket attribute of concern may be significantly affected by the 
factors identified by Beshears et al. 
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Although the data and methods used in revealed-preference studies of nonmarket 
outcomes have been scrutinized (see, for example, Dockins et al. 2004), to the best of our 
knowledge these reviews have not systematically addressed the full range of behavioral issues 
listed above. More work is needed to determine the extent to which revealed-preference studies 
reflect normative preferences, rather than decisionmaking biases, when used to value the diverse 
outcomes associated with social programs. Thus while there is substantial synergy between the 
findings of behavioral economics and the evolving conduct of stated-preference research, more 
consideration of the implications of behavioral anomalies for revealed-preference research may 
also be desirable. 
 
5.3 Conclusions and Implications 
 
Under the standard economic model, the goal of nonmarket valuation is to mimic a market: to 
estimate the amount of money that individuals would be willing to exchange for these outcomes 
if they could be directly bought and sold. Under standard assumptions, these choices would be 
consistent with individual welfare. However, implementing this approach presents challenges 
given the findings of behavioral research. If individuals make mistakes, and their choices do not 
correspond with their welfare (as self-defined), relying on choices for valuation may not lead to 
the identification of the policy option that best enhances social welfare. Improving related studies 
so that they result in well-informed, thoughtful preferences is thus an important goal for 
researchers and policy analysts. 
These issues have received substantial attention over the years in stated preference 
research, although the proliferation of new studies suggests that more review and integration is 
now needed. They have received relatively little attention when revealed preference methods are 
used, although similar issues may arise in market contexts. 
This discussion has implications for both researchers and policy analysts: 
 
1) Researchers should continue to incorporate the results of behavioral research into the design 
of valuation studies where useful and relevant, with the goal of identifying well-informed, 
thoughtful preferences, regardless of whether stated- or revealed-preference methods are 
used. 
2) When evaluating study quality for benefit transfer, analysts should consider possible 
decisionmaking bias along with other uncertainties, including any evidence that the study 
population did not fully understand the context or made other cognitive errors. 
 
6. DETERMINING THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS  
 
Many reviews of the implications of behavioral economics compare and contrast a simplified 
version of the standard economic model with the findings of behavioral research. However, the 
standard model both can and does incorporate more complex considerations than suggested by 
these reviews. Some of these complexities reflect elaboration of the model; e.g., to incorporate 
lifecycle consumption, household production, or social-welfare functions. Others integrate 
behavioral findings, such as the effects of psychological factors on the valuation of nonmarket 
outcomes. Overall, the conduct of benefit-cost analysis reflects a number of pragmatic concerns, 
using economic theory as a starting point, incorporating behavioral considerations, and focusing 
on information that is useful for decisionmaking. In practice, the gap between the traditional and 
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behavioral models is narrower than it might appear, and there is substantial synergy between 
nonmarket valuation and behavioral research. 
The discussion in the prior sections of this paper suggests additional avenues to explore. 
Below, we first summarize the recommendations from the previous sections. We then discuss the 
more general implications for the conduct and interpretation of benefit-cost analysis, focusing on 
its practical implementation.  
 
6.1 Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In this paper, we discuss the implications of behavioral economics for analyzing the benefits and 
costs of social policies and programs. While recognizing that behavioral research can aid in 
predicting program participation rates and effectiveness, as well as in predicting real resource 
costs conditional on these responses, we focus on the valuation of program benefits and costs. 
We take the role of the analyst who is asked to assess an exogenously-determined program or 
policy, and seeks advice on incorporating the results of behavioral research into the assessment 
given currently available data. We consider four areas: context-dependent valuation of 
nonmarket benefits (Section 2); present bias and exponential versus hyperbolic discounting 
(Section 3); social preferences such as altruism and equity (Section 4); and the conduct of 
nonmarket valuation studies (Section 5). 
Because behavioral economics is a large and rapidly growing field, the significance or 
pervasiveness of many of its findings are not yet clear, and these findings have not yet been 
combined into a widely-accepted model that supplements or supplants the standard economic 
framework. As a result, we often raise questions for further research or note options for the 
analyst rather than trying to resolve the underlying issues. Throughout, we attempt to maintain 
the traditional perspective of benefit-cost analysis as describing the preferences of affected 
individuals (contingent on baseline conditions, including the current distribution of income and 
other resources). While we recognize that individual choices may include errors; i.e., diverge 
from what the individuals might choose given better information and more experience or 
reflection, we urge caution in substituting the judgment of the analyst for the information 
collected from representative members of the population. 
 In Table 1, we summarize our key recommendations. 
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Table 1. Summary of Major Recommendations 
VALUING PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES 
1) Studies should be designed to test the effects of the psychologically-salient attributes found in behavioral 
research on benefit values, as well as the effects of other physical and psychological attributes. 
2) Such studies should consider both the holistic effect of the full range of attributes relevant to a particular 
context, and the effects of varying the attributes one-by-one to develop adjustments for transferring values to 
other contexts. 
3) Values should be not be rejected unless the study does not meet basic criteria for quality or adhere to generally-
accepted principles for best practices. Rejected values, and the basis for rejecting them, should be clearly 
documented. 
4) When values are uncertain, sensitivity, probabilistic, or breakeven analysis should be used to test the effects of 
this uncertainty on the results. 
5) Where quantitative estimates are not available, the potential effects of both psychologically-salient and physical 
attributes should be discussed qualitatively. 
ESTIMATING TIME PREFERENCES 
1) Analysts should provide a schedule of undiscounted costs and benefits, in the form of a bar chart (or other 
graphic) or a table, so that the decisionmaker can inspect this pattern. Simply summarizing costs and benefits as 
a net present value does not provide adequate information given related uncertainties. 
2) In choosing a discount rate or set of rates, as well as a functional form (exponential or hyperbolic) analysts must 
be clear about what, conceptually, they intend to represent for review by decisionmakers. The quality of the 
underlying data and related assumptions should also be described. 
3) Analysts should consider the impact of alternative rates on their results, in particular emphasizing the discount 
rates at which benefits do, and do not, exceed costs, and/or at which the relative ranking of different policy 
options change. Comparing these switch points to rates reported in the empirical literature will provide insights 
into the implications of related uncertainties for decisionmaking. 
SEPARATING PRIVATE FROM SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
1) In addition to other psychological attributes, studies should be designed to test the effects of social preferences 
on benefit values, focusing on outcomes associated with social programs rather than private goods or services. 
2) When reviewing studies for benefit transfer, analysts should consider whether the results are likely to reflect 
other-regarding as well as private preferences, and discuss the implications for both the analysis of economic 
efficiency and its relationship to equity concerns. 
IMPROVING VALUATION STUDIES 
1) Researchers should continue to incorporate the results of behavioral research into the design of valuation studies 
where useful and relevant, with the goal of identifying well-informed, thoughtful preferences, regardless of 
whether stated- or revealed-preference methods are used. 
2) When evaluating study quality for benefit transfer, analysts should consider possible decisionmaking bias along 
with other uncertainties, including any evidence that the study population did not fully understand the context or 
made other cognitive errors. 
 
 As the above summary indicates, behavioral research is not yet sufficient to support 
specific recommendations for adapting the practice of benefit-cost analysis in many areas. Our 
recommendations are thus similar to current best practice recommendations, which take into 
account uncertainty in the underlying data and analyses. In some cases (such as time preferences 
and the design of stated-preference studies), the behavioral research base is relatively large and 
additional criteria-driven review may be helpful. In other areas (such as social preferences), the 
behavioral research is limited and does not necessarily address outcomes relevant to the 
evaluation of social programs. In the near term, the implications of behavioral research can be 
explored by testing the sensitivity of the results to different values, using probabilistic or 
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breakeven analysis, or discussing impacts qualitatively. In the longer term, more significant 
changes may be warranted as new research becomes available. 
  
6.2 Benefit-Cost Analysis as Applied Pragmatism 
 
Conducting benefit-cost analysis is challenging, regardless of whether framed by the traditional 
or behavioral economic model. However, denoting values in monetary terms has the advantage 
of providing information on the intensity as well as the direction of preferences. It also mimics 
the effects of policy decisions, which often require trading money for the outcomes of concern.39 
Thus we believe that valuation research provides useful information, despite its limitations – as 
long as the analyst is clear about the implications of these limitations for the conclusions of the 
analysis. 
 Those conducting such analysis may be most comfortable describing it as a positive, 
descriptive exercise, that provides decisionmakers with factual information on the preferences of 
those potentially affected by the benefits and costs of the policy. Behavioral economics questions 
aspects of this model, suggesting that individuals do not always act rationally, are motivated in 
part by social preferences, and make choices that do not necessarily coincide with their own 
long-term welfare even as self-defined. 
One possible response to these findings is to substitute a paternalistic approach for the 
positive or descriptive model, placing the analyst and/or policymaker in the position of deciding 
which preferences are rational and welfare-enhancing and which are not. This is a task worthy of 
Solomon, because the dividing line will often be vague and preferences that appear nonsensical 
on the surface may become more sensible as one digs deeper. The alternative is to continue to 
work on developing information on the preferences that emerge when individuals are well-
informed and have the opportunity for reflection. This task may require the endurance of 
Hercules, however. While we can clearly improve our understanding of these preferences, the 
complex attributes of social programs as well as the complexities of human judgment mean that 
our understanding of these preferences will always be somewhat imperfect. 
Fortunately, the approaches currently used in benefit-cost analysis provide several 
practical tools for dealing with these uncertainties. These tools include quantitative sensitivity, 
probabilistic, and breakeven analysis, qualitative discussion of the implications of concerns that 
cannot be easily quantified, and explicit recognition that benefit-cost analysis should be only one 
of several inputs into policy decisions. 
These concerns suggest a more pragmatic role for benefit-cost analysis than indicated by 
either the simplified version of the standard economic model or by behavioral economics.40 
Imagine again our prototypical policy analyst, asked to provide information that supports a 
recommendation about whether or not to proceed with an exogenously-determined policy option. 
                                                 
39 In addition, given the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criteria, Hammitt (2009) notes, “[t]he justification for 
using a monetary metric is that money can be transferred among affected individuals at low or modest cost (e.g., 
through changes in the tax code and income-support programs), but other possible metrics are more difficult or 
costly to transfer” (p. 194). 
40 There is a large literature on the rationale for conducting benefit-cost analysis that is too extensive to summarize 
here, including more philosophical discussions (e.g., Adler and Posner 2006) as well as more detailed practical 
recommendations (e.g., Harrington et al. 2000). In particular, Sunstein (2000) argues that benefit-cost analysis “is 
most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds – as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and 
social cognition” (p. 1059), describing how such analysis can be used to counterbalance related errors. 
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If well-conducted, following the benefit-cost analysis framework provides the analyst with 
several advantages. While some of these advantages are not exclusive to benefit-cost analysis, in 
combination they help develop useful information for decisions. 
 
1) Benefit-cost analysis offers a well-established and tested approach for identifying and 
assessing the physical impacts of different policy options in addition to estimating their 
economic value, supported by substantial research and guidance documents that address best 
practices as well as by numerous examples of previously completed studies. 
2) Benefit-cost analysis’ focus on monetization provides information on the intensity of 
preferences as well as on individuals’ willingness to make the types of trade-offs implicit in 
many social policy decisions (which involve exchanging money for social outcomes rather 
than for other goods and services) while not precluding the consideration of nonquantifiable 
effects and uncertainty. 
3) Benefit-cost analysis promotes a broad perspective, by incorporating the preferences of 
individuals affected by the costs and/or benefits of the policy options rather than being 
limited to the preferences of those most directly involved in the decision. 
4) Benefit-cost analysis encompasses several tools for incorporating uncertain outcomes and 
values, including sensitivity, probabilistic, and breakeven analysis as well as qualitative 
discussion. 
5) Benefit-cost analysis aids in focusing data collection and research and provides rough 
“stopping rules” for these efforts. These include the principle of proportionate analysis 
(matching the level of analytic effort to the stakes of the decision) and value of information 
considerations (focusing on research that is likely to affect the decision), essentially applying 
a benefit-cost test to the analysis itself. 
6) Benefit-cost analysis provides a transparent record of the data, assumptions, and analyses 
considered in the decision, if well-documented. 
7) Benefit-cost analysis helps decisionmakers and stakeholders to clarify areas of agreement 
and disagreement, separating data from assumptions and allowing those who disagree to test 
the effects of alternative analytic approaches. 
 
Under this formulation, benefit-cost analysis becomes one of many sources of information for 
decisionmaking rather than providing “the” answer to a policy question. It is instead a method 
for collecting, organizing, and evaluating information relevant to the decision. 
In summary, when taken to the extreme, traditional economic theory can be interpreted as 
suggesting that decisions are always rational and welfare-enhancing, while behavioral economics 
could be interpreted as suggesting that individual choices are so unstable and prone to error as to 
render the results of benefit-cost analysis meaningless. Both extremes substantially overstate the 
implications of related research. Analysts recognize that benefit-cost analysis as traditionally 
conducted is one of many sources of information, and must be supplemented by consideration of 
other concerns including nonquantified effects and equity. Behavioral researchers acknowledge 
that behavioral anomalies may be limited in occurrence and/or in significance, and that these 
anomalies can be counterbalanced to varying degrees by education and experience. 
 The introduction to this paper suggests that the core issue raised by behavioral economics 
is whether choices in fact reflect welfare-enhancing preferences. The answer to this question 
appears to be “it depends.” In some cases, behavioral research has identified attributes that 
individuals may truly value, that are not explicitly incorporated into the standard economic 
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model. In other cases, decisions may reflect simplifying heuristics or emotional responses that 
drive a wedge between choices and underlying, normative preferences. We are far from fully 
understanding these distinctions, but the questions raised by behavioral economics provide useful 
insights for how we might further explore these issues. While benefit-cost analysis is useful for 
many reasons, it will inevitably have limitations. Clear discussion of its implications and 
uncertainties will always be required.  
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